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Trade Openness and Antitrust Law
Anu Bradford    Columbia University
Adam S. Chilton    University of Chicago
Abstract
Openness to international trade and adoption of anti trust laws can both curb 
anticompetitive behavior. But scholars have long debated the relationship be­
tween the two. Some argue that greater openness to trade makes anti trust laws 
unnecessary, while others contend that anti trust laws are still needed to realize 
the benefits of trade liberalization. Limitations of data have made this debate 
largely theoretical to date. We study the relationship between trade and anti trust 
regimes empirically using new data on anti trust laws and enforcement activities. 
We find that openness to trade and stringency of anti trust laws are positively 
correlated from 1950 to 2010 overall, but the positive correlation disappears in 
the early 1990s as a large number of countries adopt anti trust laws. However, 
we find a positive correlation between openness to trade and resources and ac­
tivities for anti trust enforcement for both early and late adopters of anti trust 
regimes during this period.
1. Introduction
Increasing exposure to international trade and increasing the stringency of anti­
trust laws are both ways that countries can curb anticompetitive behavior. For 
instance, if a country wants to prevent a domestic manufacturer with monopoly 
power from charging supracompetitive prices, one solution would be to reduce 
barriers to foreign firms looking to import into the country. As long as the world 
This research has benefited from helpful comments by many of our colleagues. We are particu­
larly grateful to Rachel Brewster, Dhammika Dharmapala, Eric Helland, William Hubbard, Kater­
ina Linos, Kyle Rozema, Alan Sykes, and Bartek Woda and participants of the 2017 Conference for 
Empirical Legal Studies, the 2017 Conference of Empirical Legal Studies in Asia, the Law and Eco­
nomics Workshop at King’s College in London, the Law and Economics Workshop at ETH Zurich, 
the International Law Workshop at Berkeley Law School at the University of California, and fac­
ulty workshops at Columbia Law School and the University of Chicago Law School. We owe special 
thanks to the over 100 research assistants at Columbia Law School who helped us gather and code 
the anti trust data. We are similarly indebted to the anti trust enforcers in the 103 agencies that gen­
erously provided information for this study. We gratefully acknowledge the funding by the National 
Science Foundation that supported the early data­gathering effort (Law and Social Sciences Program 
grants 1228453 and 1228483). The coding was expanded with the generous support of the Columbia 
Public Policy Grant “Does Antitrust Policy Promote Market Performance and Competitiveness?” 
and additional financial support from Columbia Law School.
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price for the goods is lower than the price the domestic manufacturer is charging, 
import competition will make supracompetitive prices unsustainable. But an­
other solution to the same problem is to adopt an anti trust law that prevents the 
manufacturer from abusing its dominant position in the market.
Although trade and anti trust law can achieve many of the same ends, scholars 
have long debated whether open economies will still benefit from enacting anti­
trust regimes. Some scholars argue that anti trust laws are redundant in the pres­
ence of open trade because foreign entrants are sufficient to destabilize cartels, 
constrain dominant companies, and undermine other anticompetitive practices, 
thereby keeping market competition in check (see, for example, Bhagwati 1968; 
Helpman and Krugman 1989; Blackhurst 1991; Neven and Seabright 1997; Melitz 
and Ottaviano 2008). In contrast, other scholars argue that, even with high levels 
of trade, anti trust laws are needed to ensure that private anticompetitive prac­
tices do not replace public barriers to trade and offset gains from trade liberaliza­
tion (see, for example, Bond 2013; Motta and Onida 1997; Bartók and Mi roudot 
2008).1 However, this debate has been largely theoretical to date.
This is likely because studying this question empirically requires solving two 
problems. First, it requires having a measure of the stringency of countries’ anti­
trust regimes. Although a number of research projects have collected cross­ 
national data on anti trust policies, these efforts have limitations that make it dif­
ficult to address this question. Second, estimating the effect of openness to trade 
(hereafter, trade openness) on anti trust policy requires identifying a method that 
can exogenously estimate countries’ exposure to trade. This is because measures 
of trade openness typically express trade as a fraction of the total economy, but 
anti trust policies can affect the size of the economy and in turn directly influence 
the measure of trade openness. Given these obstacles, little is known about the 
relationship between countries’ levels of trade openness and the anti trust laws 
they adopt.
We test the relationship between trade openness and anti trust laws while ad­
dressing both of these problems. To measure the stringency of anti trust laws, we 
draw on what we believe to be the most comprehensive data set on anti trust laws 
to date. To build the data set, we identified every country with an anti trust law 
in place by 2010 and then set out to code every anti trust law that they passed 
since their first anti trust law was adopted. We coded 700 anti trust laws for 126 
countries. For each law, we coded 171 pieces of information, including detailed 
information about the scope of the authority it bestows on the government and 
the law’s substantive provisions. Using these data, we constructed a new measure 
of the stringency of countries’ anti trust regimes: the competition law index (CLI). 
In addition to coding anti trust laws, we also constructed several additional data 
sets on anti trust regimes—including a data set of anti trust agencies’ resources 
1 Others suggest that the relationship between trade and at least merger policy is entirely ambig­
uous, with no reason to expect any particular correlation between the two (Horn and Levinsohn 
2001).
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and enforcement activities between 1990 and 2010—that we use to further probe 
this question.
To account for the endogenous relationship between anti trust laws and eco­
nomic growth, we estimate a series of gravity equations to generate a measure 
of trade openness that is exogenous to countries’ economic growth. We extend 
a version of a gravity model developed by Ortega and Peri (2014) to predict the 
value of trade between pairs of countries using information about the geographic 
relationship between the countries and their relative sizes. We build on their 
method by using more extensive trade data to generate predictions for the trade 
between pairs of countries from 1950 to 2010. By aggregating the total predicted 
trade for each country in each year, we generate estimates of countries’ total pre­
dicted trade.
Our primary econometric specification uses two­stage least squares (2SLS) re­
gressions to assess the relationship between trade openness and the stringency 
of anti trust laws (hereafter, anti trust stringency) while instrumenting for trade 
openness with our predicted trade measure. Using panel data from 1950 to 2010, 
we find that trade openness and anti trust stringency are positively correlated. 
This overall result holds when we use a variety of alternative methods to mea­
sure them. We then extend our analysis by estimating cross­sectional regressions 
for individual years. Doing so reveals that the positive correlation between trade 
openness and anti trust stringency disappears in the early 1990s. We show that 
this is not because the relationship changed for early adopters (countries that ad­
opted anti trust regimes prior to 1990) but instead because there is no clear rela­
tionship between trade openness and the anti trust policies for the late adopters 
(countries that adopted anti trust regimes in the 1990s or thereafter). Finally, we 
extend our analysis using data on anti trust enforcement resources and activities 
from 1990 to 2010 that we collected by corresponding with 100 anti trust agencies 
around the world. Using these data, we find that although there is not a clear cor­
relation between trade openness and anti trust laws from 1990 to 2010, there is a 
positive correlation between trade openness and greater anti trust enforcement 
during that time. Moreover, this relationship exists for both early and late adopt­
ers of anti trust regimes. One interpretation of this pattern is that countries with 
low exposure to trade may have adopted stringent anti trust laws after 1990 but 
have not necessarily enforced them.
Although we provide new evidence on the relationship between trade openness 
and anti trust policies, this paper has several limitations. Notably, our empirical 
strategy cannot show whether trade openness causes changes in anti trust law; in­
stead, we can test only if there is likely a correlation. In addition, we do not ad­
dress whether having both high levels of trade openness and stringent anti trust 
regimes leads to better economic performance. Our results also do not explain 
why countries with greater trade openness adopt stricter anti trust regimes. Coun­
tries might do so because combining trade and anti trust is welfare enhancing, but 
it is also plausible that countries adopt anti trust regimes to protect their markets 
from foreign competition as traditional tools for protectionism wane with the lib­
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eralization of trade (compare Cremieux and Snyder 2016). Our focus is on docu­
menting the empirical relationship between these two tools of economic regula­
tion, and we leave these important related questions to future research.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the prevalent theories of the 
relationship between trade openness and anti trust regulation. Section 3 describes 
the data we collected to measure anti trust stringency. Section 4 explains the ap­
proach we use to estimate trade openness by predicting trade between countries 
on the basis of their geography and size. Section 5 reports our primary results and 
a range of robustness tests that examine the overall relationship between trade 
openness and anti trust stringency. Section 6 conducts a series of cross­sectional 
regressions that analyze the trends by year. Section 7 explores the relationship be­
tween trade openness and anti trust enforcement resources and activities. Section 
8 concludes.
2. The Relationship between Trade and Antitrust Law
We begin by outlining two common theoretical claims about the relationship 
between trade openness and anti trust law. A brief discussion of the literature that 
empirically tests the relationship between these two policies follows.
2.1. Trade and Antitrust Law as Substitutes
Many scholars suggest that trade liberalization may make adopting an anti trust 
regime unnecessary (Bhagwati 1968; Helpman and Krugman 1989; Blackhurst 
1991; Neven and Seabright 1997; Melitz and Ottaviano 2008). According to this 
view, free trade is an effective way to ensure that markets remain competitive be­
cause facilitating entry checks market power (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig 1982). 
For example, when an economy is open to trade, monopolists refrain from abus­
ing their market power because low external barriers ensure that competitors can 
enter the market and contest any such abusive practices. In this way, trade lib­
eralization renders an anti trust intervention into monopolistic practices super­
fluous. Exports fueled by trade liberalization should also enhance market com­
petition. New opportunities in export markets ensure that more firms can reach 
an efficient scale of production, which further spurs competition and reduces the 
need for an anti trust regime (Bartók and Miroudot 2008).
Relying on trade liberalization to safeguard market competition could have 
several advantages. First, foreign producers must incur certain fixed costs and 
variable trade costs to enter a new market that domestic producers do not in­
cur. If foreign firms are able to enter and effectively compete even after incurring 
those costs, they are presumably more efficient and hence may act as an even 
more effective discipline on the market than domestic firms (Bartók and Mir­
oudot 2008). Second, choosing free trade over anti trust regulation eliminates the 
need to rely on government bureaucracies. Many who remain skeptical of gov­
ernmental intervention favor free trade and thus prefer to have imports disci­
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pline anticompetitive behavior. This argument may gain all the more force today 
considering the complexities associated with anti trust regulators from over 130 
countries all applying different rules in an effort to regulate the global market­
place. Finally, although trade openness may “act as an effective anti trust policy” 
(Pomfret 1992, p. 11), an effective anti trust policy does not act as an effective 
trade policy. For example, if the United States were to impose a 30 percent tariff 
on foreign producers today, foreign firms would likely not enter no matter how 
competitive the markets are behind the border. Domestic anti trust laws thus may 
do little to facilitate market entry in the presence of highly protectionist trade 
policy.
2.2. Trade and Antitrust Law as Complements
Alternatively, since both free trade and vigorous anti trust enforcement disci­
pline dominant firms, governments seeking to constrain dominant companies 
may pursue both policies to the same end. Hence, there should be a positive re­
lationship between free trade and the use of anti trust policies. Many scholars in­
deed argue that trade and anti trust policy are likely to be positively correlated 
(Bond 2013; Motta and Onida 1997; Bartók and Miroudot 2008; Bradford and 
Büthe 2012). For instance, Bartók and Miroudot (2008) acknowledge that trade 
policy and anti trust policy can act as substitutes because both destabilize cartels 
and hence foster competition. However, the authors nevertheless describe trade 
and competition policy as “mutually reinforcing.” This is in part because the ben­
efits from collusion may be greater in the presence of open trade. For example, 
open trade allows companies to operate across multiple markets and to extract 
larger rents as a result (Bond 2013). Such cartels are also harder to detect and 
prosecute because evidence may be scattered across multiple jurisdictions. This 
may increase the net benefits from collusion, which makes anticompetitive be­
havior more likely in the presence of open trade. This could explain why several 
international cartels have successfully operated over multiple years and countries, 
even in periods coinciding with substantial economic openness (Connor 2007).
Governments may thus deliberately strengthen anti trust regulations in the 
presence of free trade to ensure that private anticompetitive conduct does not 
undermine gains from trade liberalization. This logic motivated the adoption of 
anti trust regulations by the European Union (EU), which initially adopted anti­
trust rules to complement efforts to liberalize trade between EU member states. 
The fear was that, without such laws, private companies could recreate barriers 
between member states and undermine the functioning of the single market. 
Antitrust laws were hence needed to ensure that the gains from free trade could 
be fully realized and preserved. Antitrust laws and trade policies are also often 
viewed as complementary because, while trade policy seeks to dismantle public 
barriers to trade, anti trust law removes private barriers. Similarly, while trade lib­
eralization seeks to maximize a country’s total surplus, anti trust law is more com­
34 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS
monly aimed at the maximization of consumer surplus.2 These differences alone 
may explain governments’ willingness to deploy both sets of policies as comple­
mentary tools to preserve economic openness and market competition.
In addition, even if foreign firms are able to enter a market, they may not be 
able to penetrate it and effectively compete if the market is tied by exclusive dis­
tribution agreements. For example, in the 1980s, the US government complained 
that, despite the liberalization of trade with Japan, US firms could not compete 
on the Japanese market in industries such as automobiles and photographic film. 
According to the critics, local anti trust laws failed to condemn exclusive distri­
bution agreements that prevented US firms from having access to retailers and 
hence to local consumers (Bond 2013; Scherer 1994). This illustrates how trade 
policies may go only so far in rendering markets competitive, necessitating anti­
trust to complement them.
2.3. Trade and Antitrust Law in Practice
Only a handful of studies have tested the relationship between trade open­
ness and anti trust law empirically. Waked (2010) finds that trade openness and 
anti trust enforcement resources are negatively correlated in a sample of devel­
oping countries. A few other studies support the view that trade alone can ren­
der markets competitive. Those studies generally examine the effects of import 
penetration on some measure of competition—like market concentration ratios 
or price­cost markup (Bartók and Miroudot 2008)—and find a negative correla­
tion between trade openness and markups (Levinsohn 1993; Roberts and Tybout 
1996; Tybout 2001). This implies that higher levels of imports lead to more com­
petition and lower prices.
A few empirical studies instead suggest that trade openness and stringent anti­
trust regimes may be positively correlated. Feinberg (1990) studies the correla­
tion between the reduction in tariffs and anti trust enforcement budgets in the 
United States, finding a positive association between trade liberalization and anti­
trust enforcement. Feinberg also finds a comparable association between anti­
trust fines and trade openness. Horn and Levinsohn (2001) reach a similar re­
sult when examining merger policies and trade liberalization. While their results 
are largely ambiguous, they conclude that trade liberalization may lead to stricter 
anti trust standards. Cremieux and Snyder (2016) examine cartel enforcement by 
the United States and the EU and find, among other things, that the United States 
imposes higher fines on foreign firms than domestic firms. If the nationality of 
firms influences the enforcement of anti trust policy as they suggest, it may fol­
low that anti trust laws are enforced more aggressively in the presence of foreign 
competition.
2 However, our coding of the goals of anti trust laws suggests that some countries—including Can­
ada and New Zealand—pursue total welfare as opposed to consumer welfare through anti trust laws. 
This suggest that some jurisdictions see the goals of trade and anti trust policy as more overlapping 
as opposed to distinct yet complementary.
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3. Measuring Antitrust Stringency
3.1. Prior Data Collection
The biggest hurdle to testing these theories on the relationship between trade 
and antitrust is having the data to do so. Although there have been a number of 
efforts to produce cross­national measures of anti trust policies (for example, Gut­
mann and Voigt 2014; Petersen 2013; Ma 2011; Buccirossi et al. 2011; Clougherty 
2010; Waked 2010; Voigt 2009; Nicholson 2008; Hylton and Deng 2007; Kee and 
Hoekman 2007), all of the existing measures suffer from at least one major lim­
itation.
First, several of the existing cross­national measures of anti trust law rely on a 
binary coding of whether anti trust law exists in a given country­year (Gutmann 
and Voigt 2014; Petersen 2013; Kee and Hoekman 2007). The problem with us­
ing a binary coding for our research question is that it disregards the significant 
variation among the laws. As a result, although it can be used to show whether 
countries adopt anti trust laws in response to trade openness, it cannot distin­
guish whether countries adopt more or less stringent regimes on the basis of their 
exposure to trade.
Second, most data sets that go beyond a binary measure have coded informa­
tion on only a small sample of countries. For instance, Buccirossi et al. (2011) 
develop a comprehensive index of countries’ anti trust regimes but do so for just 
13 Organisation for Economic Co­operation and Development (OECD) mem­
bers. Similarly, Clougherty (2010) collects data on the number of merger notifi­
cations in 32 countries, Kee and Hoekman (2007) use a sample of 42 countries, 
Nicholson (2008) uses a sample of 52 countries, and Voigt (2009) uses a sample 
of 58 countries. Hylton and Deng (2007) is an exception. In what we believe is the 
most ambitious previous effort to collect anti trust data, they code the statutes of 
102 countries and produce an index of the overall stringency of national anti trust 
laws.
Third, most existing data sets cover a limited number of years. For instance, 
while Hylton and Deng (2007) develop a comprehensive measure of countries’ 
anti trust regimes, their data cover only 2001–4. Others collect data for similar 
periods: Nicholson (2008) for 2003, Voigt (2009) for 1990–2000, Ma (2011) for 
1990–2004, and Gutmann and Voigt (2014) for 2004–10.
3.2. Our Data Collection
Our goal was to comprehensively code every anti trust law every country had 
ever adopted.3 To do so, we first identified the jurisdictions that adopted an anti­
trust law by 2010.4 Our research identified 126 such countries. For each country, 
we went back to the first law that it enacted and tried to identify every subsequent 
3 We fully explain the data collection process in Bradford et al. (2019).
4 We elected to start our data set with 2010 data for practical considerations: we began collecting 
data several years ago, and we selected a data point a few years prior so that we could reliably obtain 
copies of laws that had been passed.
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law it passed until 2010. We included general anti trust laws, relevant sector­ 
specific regulations, and other laws (such as criminal laws or constitutions) that 
contain provisions regulating market competition. Using this approach, we 
coded 700 anti trust laws in place by the end of 2010.5
Figure 1 indicates the countries that had an anti trust law in place every 10 years 
from 1960 to 2010. Figure 1 shows that, over the years, anti trust regimes have 
been adopted in countries around the world, including by democracies and non­
democracies and by developed and developing countries alike. In fact, anti trust 
regimes have become so common that, by 2010, the 126 countries with anti trust 
laws contributed 95.4 percent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). Fig­
ure 1 also shows that most countries adopted anti trust laws in the last 30 years, 
with the greatest expansion taking place in the 1990s.
In addition to identifying these laws, we developed a survey instrument to code 
their content. We built on the coding schemes used by Hylton and Deng (2007) 
and Nicholson (2008) as a starting point for our coding instrument. With the ad­
vantage of hindsight, we added variables to more thoroughly measure each coun­
try’s anti trust laws. Our survey instrument thus includes 171 entry fields, with 
questions covering the scope of the anti trust authority, merger control, the abuse 
of a dominant position, and anticompetitive agreements.
To complete the coding, we recruited and trained a team of law students. We 
engaged students who were trained in different jurisdictions and possessed rele­
vant language skills. Each law was assigned to two coders for independent review. 
Both coders followed identical procedures, reaching out for guidance as needed 
from us and senior coders who had extensive experience in the project. For coun­
tries that had passed multiple laws over time or in the same year, the coders re­
searched the relationship between each law so that we could annualize the data 
and have an accurate picture of a country’s anti trust regime in any given year.6 
Once two coders completed coding laws for a country, a third coder completed 
a discrepancy analysis by reviewing all fields in which the original coders pro­
vided differing responses, consulting the text of the underlying law. The output 
of the discrepancy analysis produced a final consensus response to every field for 
every law. Countries that did not have a law in a given year were coded 0 for all 
variables. We thus created a country­year data set for all countries in the interna­
tional state system.
5 We have not completed the coding of laws in three jurisdictions. We were unable to obtain a 
copy of laws we believe to exist for two countries—Djibouti and Iran—and we have been unable to 
complete coding of the Faroe Islands because we have not yet identified coders with appropriate lan­
guage skills. To account for this, all of our regressions include an unreported indicator variable for 
the country­years for which we have identified a law that we have not yet been able to code.
6 We researched the relationship between laws to understand whether subsequent laws supple­
mented or replaced prior provisions. For instance, if a country passed a law in 1980 that required 
merger notification and then passed a new law in 1990 that did not mention merger notification, we 
tried to determine whether that was because the new law removed the merger notification require­
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3.3. Creating the Competition Law Index
Once we had coded the contents of the world’s anti trust laws, we developed 
a measure of their stringency. Following prior research (for example, Hylton 
and Deng 2007; Nicholson 2008; Buccirossi et al. 2011), we elected to develop 
an index that measures the stringency of each country’s anti trust law in a given 
year. Because we fully introduce the CLI in Bradford and Chilton (2018), we only 
briefly describe it here. The goal of the CLI is to measure the intensity of compe­
tition regulation in any given country in any given year. It does so by aggregating 
the prohibitive elements of the various components of countries’ antitrust laws. 
The more types of behaviors the law prohibits or the more extensive remedies 
the law entails, the higher the CLI score. At the same time, the more the law rec­
ognizes defenses and exemptions from the law, the lower the CLI score. At this 
point, it is important to stress that the CLI is not a measure of the quality of an 
anti trust regime. Instead of creating a coding of whether regimes have optimal 
anti trust regimes, the CLI simply codes whether countries have provisions that 
extend or limit the possible scope of anti trust regulation. For instance, some es­
tablished anti trust jurisdictions have lower CLI scores because of their common 
tendency to include defenses that call agencies to consider procompetitive effects 
of the conduct or transaction in question.7
The CLI consists of two equally weighted parts: the first captures the authority 
that a country’s anti trust law conveys, and the second captures the substance of 
the law. By “anti trust authority,” we refer to the broader structure of the anti trust 
regime, including the powers that the law gives to enforce anti trust laws. These 
provisions determine who can bring anti trust suits and what remedies can be im­
posed if a violation is found. These provisions also define whether all industries 
and enterprise types fall within the scope of the law and whether the law can be 
applied extraterritorially.
By “substance of the law,” we refer to rules in three substantive areas: merger 
control, abuse of dominance, and anticompetitive agreements. “Merger control” 
refers to provisions regulating the notification of proposed mergers, the stan­
dards by which mergers are reviewed, and the defenses that firms can advance 
to argue that the anticompetitive effects of a merger may be offset by benefits the 
transaction generates. “Abuse of dominance” refers to provisions that determine 
the various types of a company’s conduct that constitute anticompetitive abuses 
of dominant position. Finally, “anticompetitive agreements” refer to prohibitions 
on both horizontal and vertical agreements between companies. This includes 
regulating common practices of cartels such as price fixing and market sharing 
but also vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance. These three areas are 
weighted equally.
To construct the CLI, for each country­year, countries are assigned points ac­
cording to the presence of the variables listed in Table 1. We then equally weight 
7 See Bradford and Chilton (2018) for a longer justification of the way the competition law index 
(CLI) is constructed. Section OA1 of the Online Appendix provides additional information about 
the CLI.
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the authority and substance components of the index. We then normalize all 
scores to be between 0 and 1. Country­years without an anti trust law in place 
are scored 0, and a country receives the same score for all years that it has the 
same regime in place. Figure 2 shows the score for each country in 2010 and the 
substantial variation in countries’ anti trust regimes as measured by the CLI. For 
example, Canada and Australia notably have more stringent regimes than the 
United States. (Although, as we discuss in Section 5.3, this may be due to the 
oversized role that the common law plays in anti trust regulation in the United 
States.)
Of course, one drawback of an index such as the CLI is that it relies on sub­
jective decisions about what variables to include and how to weight them. The 
decisions we made are based on discussions with leading academic experts and 
representatives of anti trust authorities and our own judgments. In Section 5.3, 
however, we test the robustness of our findings using several alternative ap­
proaches to measuring the stringency of anti trust regimes.
4. Measuring Trade Openness
4.1. Empirical Approach
The next hurdle when testing whether trade openness is associated with greater 
anti trust stringency is measuring trade openness. The fundamental difficulty 
with doing so is that trade openness both causes economic growth and is a con­
sequence of economic growth. Thus, trade may produce economic changes that 
Table 1
Components of the Competition Law Index
Score Score
Authority: Merger control:
 Private right of action 1  Pre­merger notification 1
 Fines 1  Mandatory notification 1
 Imprisonment 1  Substantive assessment: economic 1
 Divestitures 1  Substantive assessment: public interest 1
 Damages 1  Efficiency defense −.5
 Extraterritoriality 1  Failing firm defense −.5
 Industry exemptions −.5  Public interest defense −.5
 Enterprise exemptions—categorical −.5 Anticompetitive agreements:
Abuse of dominance:  Price fixing .5
 General prohibition 2  Market sharing .5
 Market access .25  Output limitations .5
 Tying .25  Bid rigging .5
 Discounts .25  Tying .5
 Unfair pricing .25  Exclusive dealing .5
 Discriminatory pricing .25  Resale price maintenance .5
 Predatory pricing .25  Elimination of competitors .5
 Retail price maintenance .25  Efficiency defense −.5
 Other abusive acts .25  Public interest defense −.5
 Efficiency defense −.5
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lead a country to adopt a stringent anti trust regime, but the adoption of an anti­
trust regime may produce economic changes that result in more trade. In other 
words, the relationship between trade and anti trust policy is endogenous.
Fortunately, scholars have developed methods to produce exogenous estimates 
of countries’ openness to trade. The first breakthrough that made this possible is 
the gravity equation, which was introduced by Tinbergen (1962) and has been 
part of mainstream macroeconomics since the mid­1990s (see generally Head 
and Mayer 2014). This equation has proven surprisingly stable across time be­
tween pairs of countries and using different methodologies (Chaney 2017). The 
basic insight of gravity models is that the trade between two countries can be 
predicted by the size of their economies and the distance between them. That is, 
bilateral trade is proportional to any two countries’ GDP and inversely propor­
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Although gravity equations make it possible to predict trade, the standard ver­
sion of the equation relies on using GDP as an input. Producing an exogenous 
estimate of trade while using the gravity equation thus required a second break­
through. This came from Frankel and Romer (1999), who argue that the gravity 
equation demonstrates that geography is a powerful predictor of trade and of a 
country’s income. But although geography can influence a country’s wealth, the 
country’s wealth cannot influence its geography. The result is that geographic de­
terminants of wealth can be introduced into the framework of a gravity equation 
to produce an estimate of expected trade into a country in a given year. Using 
this insight, Frankel and Romer estimate countries’ predicted trade on the basis 
of their geography and then use predicted trade as an instrument for trade open­
ness. Frankel and Romer’s original implementation has since been criticized for 
not accounting for all the ways in which geography can influence growth (Ro­
dríguez and Rodrik 2000; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004), but the basic 
insight underlying their model remains valid, and the approach for predicting 
trade is still used.
4.2. Implementation
To implement this method, we follow the approach developed by Ortega and 
Peri (2014). Ortega and Peri develop an exogenous instrument for trade to esti­
mate the relationship between countries’ openness to trade and migration and 
those countries’ incomes.8 They build on Frankel and Romer (1999) and subse­
quent developments to produce estimates of the bilateral trade between countries 
in 2000, using information about the countries’ relevant geography and size. The 
advantage of these equations is that, after controlling for a country’s size, vari­
8 We set aside the part of Ortega and Peri (2014) that incorporates migration and focus solely on 
trade.
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ations in the values of predicted trade shares (PTSH) are driven solely by “the 
relative position of a country in terms of its geography and cultural coordinates” 
(Ortega and Peri 2014, p. 234).
Ortega and Peri (2014) use a data set with observations for pairs of countries 
and data on the trade and relevant geographic variables for each pair. Using these 
data, they estimate the following equation to estimate the trade shares (TSH) that 
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The dependent variable TSH is the value of the trade (exports plus imports) be­
tween country c and country j divided by the GDP of country c. The equation in­
cludes 12 explanatory variables: distance between the countries, population and 
area of both countries, the number of countries that are landlocked, and dummy 
variables for a shared border, common language, common official language, 
shared time zone, colonial history, and prior hegemonic relationship. The equa­
tion includes interactions for the geography variables and shared borders.
After estimating the gravity equation, Ortega and Peri (2014) calculate the pre­
dicted values for each country pair and aggregate them for each country c. We 
replicate the specifications used by Ortega and Peri in equation (2). Also follow­
ing Ortega and Peri, to aggregate the predicted trade shares for each country c, we 
define Zcj as the vector of explanatory variables and γ as the vector of coefficients 
in equation (2). We then aggregate the predicted trade share for country c by us­
ing the following formula:
 
¹
=å ˆ(3) TSH exp( ).c cj
j c
Zg  (3)
Ortega and Peri (2014) generate PTSH only for 2000, but because we have exten­
sive time­series data on anti trust laws, we set out to develop a prediction of trade 
between countries for as long a period as possible. This requires two key changes 
to Ortega and Peri’s approach. First, we use a different source of trade data to 
cover more years. To obtain data on bilateral trade from 1950 to 2010, we use the 
Correlates of War bilateral trade data set and the International Monetary Fund’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics data set.9
9 Despite using these two data sets, there are dyad­year observations for which the data are miss­
ing for various reasons. We also exclude data from Liberia and Tuvalu from our analysis because of 
extreme fluctuations in their trade data.
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Second, we estimate our gravity equation separately for each year from 1950 
to 2010. The reason for doing so is that, although the variables used to instru­
ment for trade are primarily time invariant, the geographic costs of trade change 
over time (Feyrer 2009a, 2009b). Estimating the equation separately for each year 
allows the coefficients for the instrumental variables to take different values for 
each year (see Badinger and Nindl 2014). It is important to note that, although 
many papers that use this strategy to estimate trade openness rely exclusively 
on a single year of cross­sectional data (for example, Frankel and Romer 1999), 
others either pool observations across years to test the overall relationships (for 
example, Cavallo and Frankel 2008; Calderón, Chong, and Stein 2007; Badinger 
and Nindl 2014; Calderón and Kubota 2018) or estimate regressions separately 
for multiple years (for example, Irwin and Terviö 2002). Because the relationship 
between trade and anti trust law appears to have changed over time, we adopt the 
latter two strategies (reported in Sections 5 and 6).
Despite these two differences, the correlation between our estimates and the 
estimates in Ortega and Peri (2014) for 2000 is .79; when we exclude observations 
for countries for which missing data led Ortega and Peri to estimate no trade 
shares for a country, the correlation between our estimates is .89.10 To provide 
a sense of the data on trade openness, Figure 3 plots PTSH for 2010 by quintile. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the data we use in the gravity equations 
and the analysis in Sections 5–7.
5. Primary Analysis
5.1. Estimation Strategy
To estimate whether greater trade openness is associated with increased anti­
trust stringency, we use a 2SLS regression. In the first stage, we instrument for 
TSH for country c in year i with the PTSH for country c in year i. To ensure that 
our instrumental variable isolates the amount of predicted trade attributable to 
geography, following Ortega and Peri (2014) our first­stage regression also con­
trols for each country’s population and area. We lag all time­variant variables 
1 year. Our first­stage regression takes the following form:
 b b b b e- - -= + + + +, 1 0 T , 1 P , 1 A(4) TSH  PTSH lnPopulation lnArea .c i c i c i c  (4)
In the second stage, we estimate the impact of TSH on CLI score while con­
trolling for the country’s size. The second­stage equation is thus
 b b b b e- -= + + + +, 0 T , 1 P , 1 ACLI   TSH lnPopulation lnArea .(5) c i c i c i c  (5)
10 Section OA2 of the Online Appendix compares our estimates of predicted trade shares (PTSH) 
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5.2. Primary Results
Tables 3 and 4 report our baseline results. We begin in Table 3 by simply pre­
senting a reduced­form pooled OLS regression that estimates the impact of PTSH 
on CLI. Column 1 controls for the size of the country, column 2 accounts for re­
gional differences in trade and anti trust policies, and column 3 accounts for the 
possibility that there is a secular trend in anti trust stringency.11 In Table 4, we use 
the 2SLS regression strategy discussed in Section 5.1. In these regressions, in the 
first stage, PTSH is an instrument for TSH.12
There are several things worth noting about the regression specifications in 
Tables 3 and 4. First, the reason we do not include a wider range of control vari­
ables is that trade has previously been shown to impact everything from income 
(Frankel and Romer 1999) to levels of democracy (López­Córdova and Meissner 
2008), and thus many standard control variables would be inappropriate since 
they are also outcomes of exposure to trade. Second, we use region fixed effects 
instead of country fixed effects in part because there is little variance in most 
countries’ CLI scores from year to year, and thus we believe that country fixed ef­
fects are inappropriate. That said, the results that include a time trend are robust 
to the addition of year and country fixed effects.
Tables 3 and 4 suggest that, for countries of the same size, countries in which 
trade makes up a larger share of the economy are also likely to have more strin­
gent anti trust laws. The results attenuate with the addition of the time trend and 
11 The time trend we include is not country specific. In addition, the results using a time trend are 
robust to using year fixed effects instead of a linear time trend.
12 We report Kleibergen­Paap F­statistics for weak identification, which all lie above the most de­
manding critical values reported by Stock and Yogo (2005). We can thus reject the null hypothesis 
that PTSH is a weak instrument for trade openness.
Table 3
Trade Openness and Antitrust Stringency:  
Reduced-Form Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3)
PTSH .313** .334** .136*
(.055) (.050) (.060)
Population (ln) .098** .095** .071**
(.019) (.017) (.018)
Area (ln) .006 .015+ .018*
(.010) (.009) (.009)
Region dummies No Yes Yes
Time trend No No Yes
R2 .212 .335 .390
Note. The dependent variable is the competition law in­
dex. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in 
parentheses. N = 7,973.
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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region fixed effects but remain positive and statistically significant. To illustrate 
these results, Figure 4 presents a binned scatterplot that shows the relationship of 
trade openness to countries’ CLI scores using the regression specification from 
column 3 of Table 4.13 Figure 4 reveals a positive relationship between predicted 
trade shares and CLI scores.
The size of the effect is also economically significant. To measure this, we cal­
culate the marginal effects associated with a change in a country’s level of trade 
shares. While holding the other variables at their means, for column 3 in Table 
4, moving from the 10th percentile value of TSH (.16) to the 90th percentile (.95) 
is associated with a .29 change in the CLI score. As a reminder, the CLI score is 
normalized to range from 0 to 1. To put this in perspective, the country with the 
median CLI score in 2010 is .56 (approximately the value for the Ivory Coast). An 
increase of .29 would result in a score of roughly .85, which is roughly 80 coun­
tries higher on the CLI scale (approximately the value for Estonia).
13 Figure 4 first regresses trade shares (TSH) on PTSH (while controlling for population, area, re­
gion fixed effects, and a time trend) and then plots the predicted values from that regression against 
the CLI while controlling for the same variables.
Table 4
Trade Openness and Antitrust Stringency:  
Two-Stage Least Squares Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3)
Second stage:
 Trade Openness .624** .672** .378+
(.126) (.130) (.193)
 Population (ln) .107** .115** .088**
(.023) (.021) (.021)
 Area (ln) .027 .032* .027*
(.017) (.016) (.013)
First stage:
 PTSH .501** .496** .358**
(.063) (.065) (.078)
 Population (ln) −.014 −.030 −.046*
(.021) (.019) (.020)
 Area (ln) −.034+ −.025 −.023
(.018) (.018) (.018)
Region dummies No Yes Yes
Time trend No No Yes
R2 −.197 −.166 .222
F­statistics 63.803 58.906 21.280
Note. The dependent variable is the competition law in­
dex. Robust standard errors clustered by country are in 
parentheses. N = 7,970. Kleibergen­Paap F­statistics are 
for weak identification.
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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5.3. Robustness Checks
These results are robust to using alternative measures of anti trust policy and 
trade openness. Section OA3 of the Online Appendix reports our results using 
alternative measures.
Measuring Antitrust Regulation. We conduct four tests to ensure that our re­
sults are not driven by the way we construct the CLI. First, we create a subindex 
for each of the four categories of variables reported in Table 1 and then reesti­
mate our primary specifications using each of them as the dependent variable. 
Second, instead of weighting the variables in Table 1, we simply count the num­
ber of provisions each country has in its law in a given year (for example, if a 
country scores a 1 for each of the 36 variables, its score would be 36). Third, we 
use factor analysis of the variables in Table 1 to produce a new weighting scheme 
driven entirely by the characteristics of the data. Fourth, we create a binary vari­
able for the presence of an anti trust regime by coding all countries with a CLI 
score greater than 0 as 1. Across these additional specifications, the results are 
consistently positive and statistically significant. As we explain in Section 7, our 
results are also robust to using measures of anti trust enforcement resources and 
activities instead of the CLI.
Accounting for the Role of the Judiciary. In some countries, judge­made law is 
a major source of anti trust regulation. In the United States, for example, courts 
have added numerous rules to the relatively spare regulation of anticompetitive 
behavior found in statutes. If there are many countries like the United States, 
Figure 4. Relationship between trade and the competition law index
 Trade Openness and Antitrust Law 49
our coding of laws on the books may systematically bias our measure of anti trust 
stringency. To investigate this, we surveyed anti trust experts from around the 
world about the role that courts play in the development of anti trust law in their 
countries. In the survey, we asked, “In practice, do the courts generate new law 
by changing the scope of the anti trust statutes in [country]? Please answer on a 
scale from 1 (no role) to 5 (extensive role).” We recruited experts to take the sur­
vey by circulating it to contacts we made while collecting anti trust data, attend­
ees at international anti trust conferences, and members of the Academic Society 
of Competition Law. We received 166 responses from 86 countries with anti trust 
regimes.14 The results of the survey suggest that courts play a large or extensive 
role in the development of anti trust law in just 12 countries (most of which are 
known for their common­law legal traditions).15 We then reestimated our base­
line specifications while controlling for countries where courts play a large role 
in the development of anti trust law.16 The coefficients of interest remain substan­
tively similar to our primary results.
Accounting for Exemptions and Narrow Applications. Countries often ex­
plicitly stipulate that anti trust laws do not apply uniformly. Instead, the law or 
a given provision may not apply to a particular industry or enterprise. To ac­
count for this, we created a separate data set of the exemptions in countries’ anti­
trust laws by recoding the laws in our data set to record whether each provision 
contained any of the following exemptions: general industry exemptions (for 
example, exempting the telecommunications industry from tying prohibition), 
complete enterprise­type exemptions (for example, exempting all state­owned 
enterprises from tying prohibition), partial enterprise­type exemptions (for 
example, exempting state­owned enterprises from tying prohibition to the ex­
tent that they engage in provision of public services), or narrow applications (for 
example, specifying that the telecommunications industry is the only industry 
covered by the tying provision). Using these additional, more nuanced data, we 
recoded the 36 variables composing the CLI on the basis of the presence of these 
exemptions. We recoded countries coded as 1 for a given provision in a given 
year to .8 if there was a general industry exemption, to .8 if there was a complete 
enterprise­type exemption, to .9 if there was a partial enterprise­type exemption, 
and to .1 if there was narrow industry coverage.17 The results remain positive and 
statistically significant when using the adjusted CLI as the dependent variable.
Accounting for European Union Law. Our research suggests that there are 
seven regional organizations that in some way regulate their members’ anti trust 
regimes (see Section 6). For five of them, the regional law and members’ national 
laws operate in different spheres. For instance, Common Market for Eastern and 
14 For countries with multiple respondents, we averaged the responses.
15 The 12 countries that received an average score of 4 or higher are Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Spain, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.
16 We control for countries with anti trust regimes if we did not receive a response to our survey.
17 Provisions with narrow industry coverage are recoded from 1 to 0 in our primary specifications 
to reflect the fact that these laws are not of general applicability.
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Southern Africa (COMESA) rules address only cross­border anticompetitive 
conduct and leave individual member states to regulate their domestic markets. 
But this is not true of the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA), which 
have anti trust rules that split authority between the member states and the re­
gional organization (for example, some issues are regulated by national law, some 
by EU/EEA law, and some by both). To account for this, we coded the EU/EEA 
competition laws and then recoded the CLI scores of EU/EEA members to ac­
count for the regional laws. For instance, when constructing the CLI for Ger­
many, we apply the German national coding for variables if the EU treaty stipu­
lates that member states’ laws take precedence. But for variables for which the EU 
law takes precedence, the recoding uses EU law instead of German coding for the 
variable. And if EU law allows for enforcement under either German law or EU 
law, we count any given provision as existing if it can be derived from either Ger­
man law or EU law. When accounting for anti trust rules in this way, the results 
remain positive and statistically significant.
Measuring Trade Openness. We also test the robustness of our primary re­
sults using two alternative measures of trade openness that rely on countries’ pol­
icies instead of trade flows. First, we use the Sachs and Warner (1995) measure of 
trade openness. This is a binary indicator variable that treats economies as closed 
if any of the designated conditions hold (including average tariff rates exceeding 
40 percent, nontariff barriers covering over 40 percent of imports, and so on).18 
Second, we use data from the KOF globalization index (Dreher 2006) for eco­
nomic globalization, which captures policies on trade and investment flows and 
on trade and capital account restrictions from 1970 to 2013.19 We find positive 
and statistically significant relationships with both measures and CLI scores.
6. Cross-Sectional Analysis
Our analysis so far has used panel data with country­year observations. There 
are, however, several limitations to this approach. One concern is that there is 
relatively little year­to­year variance in countries’ anti trust laws. While some 
countries passed anti trust laws every few years, other countries passed one law 
and never amended it, and others have never passed an anti trust law. Another 
concern is that although we estimate the gravity model in equation (2) separately 
for each year (which allows the predicted trade to change in response to shifts 
in trade flows and the coefficients to take on different values as the geographic 
costs of trade evolve), the values for the variables included in the regression do 
not change from year to year. Finally, the relationship between trade openness 
18 A downside of this measure is that it is available only until 1992, which is particularly problem­
atic for our application because anti trust laws became much more common in the 1990s.
19 We elected to use the KOF globalization index as a measure of trade openness because it incor­
porates coding on policy for an extended period. But since the measure incorporates data on trade 
and investment flows as well as policies, this measure may suffer from the same endogeneity prob­
lems as using a standard measure based on ratios of trade to gross domestic product.
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and anti trust laws may have evolved, and pooling all observations may thus mask 
considerable variation over time.
We thus explore the relationship between trade openness and anti trust law us­
ing cross­sectional regressions. Figure 5 reports results while subsetting the data 
for each year from 1961 to 2010.20 Figure 5 plots the point estimate and 90 per­
cent confidence interval for the variable TSH using the 2SLS regression speci­
fication from column 2 of Table 4. Figure 5 reveals that the point estimates are 
positive for all years from 1960 until 1991 and that the estimates are statistically 
significant at the .1 level or higher in 23 of those years. But the pattern changes af­
ter 1991, after which the point estimates are either approximately 0 or, in a hand­
ful of years, slightly negative. In other words, the positive relationship between 
trade openness and anti trust stringency appears to disappear in the 1990s.
There are several possible explanations for this pattern. Countries’ exposure 
to trade may have changed as a result of shocks to the global economy during 
the 1990s, including the creation of the World Trade Organization, the fall of 
the Soviet Union and the opening of the eastern bloc, the rise of China’s export­
ing power, and changes to transportation costs and communications technology. 
This could have changed the relationship between trade openness and anti trust 
law even for countries with established anti trust agencies. In addition, the num­
ber of countries with anti trust regimes exploded in the 1990s, and it is possible 
that the countries that adopted regimes during this period may have done so for 
different reasons than countries that regulated anti trust policies earlier.
To investigate these explanations, Figure 6 reports the results of regressions es­
20 The coefficients are also positive in each year from 1950 to 1960. We do not report these data, 
however, because there are extremely large confidence intervals because of the limited number of 
countries with anti trust laws during this period.
Figure 5. Cross­sectional regressions, 1960–2010
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timated on two subsamples of our data: early adopters (excluding countries that 
adopted anti trust laws after 1990) and late adopters (excluding countries that ad­
opted anti trust laws before 1990).21 In Figure 6, the top panels graph the results 
of the same cross­sectional regressions reported in Figure 5, and the bottom pan­
els present binned scatterplots created when estimating regression specifications 
from column 3 of Table 4 while pooling the data from 1990 to 2010.22
The results in Figure 6A suggest that there is still a positive relationship be­
tween trade openness and anti trust policies between 1990 and 2010 when exclud­
ing late adopters. Although the results reported in Figure 6A are not statistically 
significant for this sample, the coefficients are positive, and the size of the esti­
mates is similar to those from Figure 5 for the years before 1990—they are sim­
ply less precisely estimated. As the binned scatterplot shows, the correlation is 
positive overall for this sample. Figure 6B excludes countries that had established 
anti trust agencies as of 1990. The results suggest that there is not a positive re­
lationship between trade openness and anti trust stringency when excluding the 
early adopters of anti trust law. Taken together, the results in Figure 6 suggest that 
the positive correlation between trade openness and anti trust stringency does not 
21 Both samples include countries that did not adopt anti trust laws before 2010.
22 Section OA4 of the Online Appendix recreates Tables 3 and 4 for early adopters and late adopters.
Figure 6. Trade openness and the competition law index, 1990–2010
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disappear after 1990 because of changes in the relationship for jurisdictions with 
established regimes (that is, early adopters); it disappears because there is not a 
strong correlation between trade openness and anti trust stringency in jurisdic­
tions that adopted their regimes during this period (that is, late adopters).
The next logical question is why late adopters of anti trust laws pass statutes 
with levels of stringency that do not positively correlate with their exposure to 
trade. Perhaps the most obvious explanation is that established jurisdictions like 
the EU and the United States began to urge developed and developing coun­
tries alike to adopt anti trust laws (Fox 1997). The EU, for instance, systemati­
cally requires countries to adopt anti trust laws as a condition of signing trade 
agreements with the EU or joining the EU (Hoekman 2002). Countries thus may 
have adopted anti trust laws after, or as a precondition to, signing a preferential 
trade agreement (PTA) or joining a regional organization (RO) (Kronthaler and 
Stephan 2007) and not for reasons that stem from their levels of trade openness.
We also collected data that can be used to preliminarily explore whether the 
presence of anti trust requirements in PTAs and ROs can help to explain the 
changing relationship between trade openness and anti trust stringency that be­
gan in the 1990s. First, we built a new data set of anti trust provisions in PTAs us­
ing the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 
2014).23 The DESTA team provided us with copies of the 596 PTAs for which they 
obtained copies of the text. We developed a survey instrument to code the PTAs, 
extending a sample of PTAs coded earlier (Bradford and Büthe 2015). We coded 
whether the PTA contained an obligation for signatories to have or maintain 
anti trust laws and identified 173 PTAs that contained such an anti trust require­
ment. Figure 7 maps the countries that were signatories of a PTA that contained 
an anti trust requirement by 2010. As Figure 7 shows, there was an explosion of 
PTAs that required each party to adopt or maintain an anti trust law during the 
1990s. In fact, of the 173 PTAs with such an anti trust requirement, 161 are from 
1991 or later. Moreover, almost every country in the world has signed a PTA with 
an anti trust requirement. Notably, although only 126 countries had an anti trust 
law in place by 2010, 179 countries had signed a PTA that requires them to do 
so.24
Second, we researched ROs that regulate anti trust policy in some way. The de­
gree of integration facilitated by ROs varies, ranging from the creation of custom 
unions that establish uniform external tariffs to the creation of common markets 
that allow for the free flow of capital and labor (Ravenhill 2017). We identified 
seven ROs that regulated members’ anti trust policies by 2010: the Andean Com­
munity, the Caribbean Community, COMESA, the EEA, the EU, the Economic 
Community of West African States, and the West African Economic and Mone­
23 For more information about the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) data set, see DESTA, 
Project Description (https://www.designoftradeagreements.org/project­description/). We thank the 
DESTA team for sharing the texts of the preferential trade agreements (PTAs).
24 This discrepancy may be because the requirements of PTAs are not enforced or because some 
PTAs have long implementation periods. However, we leave to future research the question of why 















































































56 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS
tary Union. Figure 8 maps the countries that are members of these ROs. In total, 
80 countries are members of these organizations, 50 of which had domestic anti­
trust laws in place by 2010. Of those countries, 20 had anti trust regulations prior 
to 1990, but 30 adopted them between 1990 and 2010.
Table 5 reports the results of regressions testing whether PTAs and ROs may 
explain the changing relationship between trade openness and anti trust strin­
gency that began in the 1990s for late adopters. The table includes observations 
for country­years between 1990 and 2010 for which the country has signed a 
PTA with an anti trust requirement and observations for the same time period 
for which the country is a member of one of the seven ROs.25 The results for both 
samples suggest that there is no clear relationship between trade openness and 
anti trust stringency for these countries. We caution, however, that these results 
should not be interpreted causally, and further research is needed to understand 
the role that PTAs and ROs have in the adoption of anti trust policies. In fact, al­
though some prior research explores the anti trust provisions of PTAs and ROs 
(Bradford and Büthe 2015; Sokol 2008), there is limited research exploring how 
these provisions have translated into domestic policies (Hoeffken 2016). Our re­
sults suggest that this may be an important avenue for inquiry.
7. Trade Openness and Antitrust Enforcement
The results in Section 6 suggest that the stringency of the anti trust laws that 
many countries adopted after the 1990s do not positively correlate with their ex­
posure to trade. Of course, statutes may not accurately capture the stringency of 
countries’ anti trust regimes. Some countries with sparse anti trust laws may ag­
gressively enforce them, while some countries with stringent laws may never pur­
sue a single case. For this reason, although the results in Section 6 suggest that the 
positive relationship between trade openness and anti trust laws disappears after 
1990, it does not mean that there was not a positive relationship between trade 
openness and anti trust enforcement.
We also built a data set on anti trust enforcement resources and activities that 
allows us to answer this question.26 Because some countries with anti trust laws 
have not established agencies to enforce those laws, we first identified jurisdic­
tions with anti trust agencies. For the agencies we identified, we reviewed publicly 
available information about their enforcement resources and activities from their 
websites and annual reports, resources such as the Global Competition Review 
and the online platform Getting the Deal Through, and research by organizations 
like the OECD and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). To supplement the publicly available information, we produced 
questionnaires individually tailored for each agency and contacted the agencies 
directly to ask for missing information or clarification when publicly available in­
25 Table 5 excludes countries that adopted anti trust laws prior to 1990—early adopters—because, 
instead of being influenced by the anti trust requirements of PTAs and regional organizations, those 
countries were likely pushing for their inclusion.
26 We fully explain the data collection process in Bradford et al. (2019).
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formation was conflicting. We typically contacted an agency following an intro­
duction by a personal contact in the agency, local anti trust practitioners, interna­
tional legal academia, or an organization such as  UNCTAD or the International 
Competition Network. In response to our inquiries, 103 agencies cooperated 
with us. We were able to obtain some data from 112 agencies representing 100 ju­
risdictions (our research suggests that 116 jurisdictions had an agency in 2010).27
From these data, we use four variables to measure anti trust resources and en­
forcement: the variable Budget is the log of the amount of money allocated for 
an anti trust­specific agency divided by the log of the country’s GDP,28 Staff Size 
is the log of the number of employees who work at the anti trust agency,29 Inves­
tigations is the log of the number of agency investigations into abuse of dom­
inance and cartels per year, and Remedies is the log of the number of abuse of 
dominance and cartel investigations that resulted in remedies.30 Figure 9 plots the 
27 We tried to collect the same data from each jurisdiction, but not all agencies provided informa­
tion about all variables or data for all relevant years. In addition, some agencies provided additional 
or slightly different information than what we requested. Our data set thus does not have complete 
coverage for all country­years for which we obtained data. Moreover, the data coverage is sparser 
earlier in the 1990s than in the 2000s. For instance, we are missing budget data for 462 country­year 
observations from 1990 to 1999 and for 334 observations from 2000 to 2010.
28 When collecting data on budgets, we asked the agencies vested with multiple responsibilities 
(such as consumer protection and anti trust law) to report only the budget dedicated to anti trust 
enforcement. We divide the natural log of the budget by the natural log of the country’s budget to 
account for differences in market size.
29 As with budgets, when collecting data on staff numbers, we asked the agencies vested with mul­
tiple responsibilities to report only the staff dedicated to anti trust enforcement.
30 We exclude merger data when calculating the number of investigations and remedies because 
firms’ merger activity may be completely exogenous to the agency. However, the results are robust 
to including merger data in these variables.
Table 5
Effect of Preferential Trade Agreements and Regional Organizations
Reduced Form Two­Stage Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Preferential trade agreements:
 PTSH .167+ −.043 −.104
(.092) (.068) (.071)
 Trade Openness .380* −.112 −.329
(.181) (.193) (.294)
Regional organizations:
 PTSH .055 −.064 −.227*
(.112) (.116) (.094)
 Trade Openness .098 −.137 −.580+
(.187) (.269) (.348)
Region dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time trend No No Yes No No Yes
Note. Dependent variables are from the anti trust enforcement data set. Robust standard errors clus­
tered by country are in parentheses. All regressions include controls for population and area. The 
first­stage instrument is PTSH.
+ p < .1.
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values for these variables for each country as of 2010. Although there is variance 
among variables, all four are positively correlated with countries’ CLI scores.31
Table 6 reports regressions using the four variables from 1990 to 2010 as the 
dependent variable. The regressions largely recreate the specifications from 
Tables 3 and 4, but given possible fluctuations in enforcement resources and ac­
tivities from year to year, columns 3 and 6 include country fixed effects. All of the 
coefficients for the trade measures are positive, and 17 of 24 of the relationships 
are statistically significant at the .1 level or higher.32 The results are especially in­
31 In 2010, the correlations with CLI for the variables are Budget = .47, Staff Size = .49, Investi­
gations = .38, and Remedies = .35.
32 The fact that the results are not consistently statistically significant may be due to measurement 
error as a result of missing values in the dependent variable. We exclude observations for which we 
were unable to collect data for the dependent variable. However, the results are substantially the 
same when we include those observations while coding their values as 0 and including a dummy 
variable for observations for which the data are missing.
Table 6
Trade Openness and Antitrust Enforcement Resources and Activities
Reduced Form Two­Stage Least Squares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Budget:
 PTSH .379** .192* .208**
(.085) (.084) (.072)
 Trade Openness 1.065** .671* 1.791
(.314) (.329) (1.145)
Staff Size:
 PTSH 1.240** .601* .757**
(.292) (.281) (.242)
 Trade Openness 3.487** 2.089* 6.484
(1.002) (1.034) (4.082)
Investigations:
 PTSH .718** .372* .219
(.180) (.173) (.207)
 Trade Openness 2.020** 1.300+ 1.892
(.626) (.660) (1.967)
Remedies:
 PTSH .311** .096 .211+
(.114) (.108) (.109)
 Trade Openness .866** .331 1.802
(.331) (.363) (1.254)
Region dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time trend No No Yes No No Yes
Country fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Note. The dependent variables are from the anti trust enforcement data set. Robust standard errors 
clustered by country are in parentheses. All regressions include controls for population and area. The 
first­stage instrument is PTSH. 
+ p < .1.
* p < .05.
** p < .01. 
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teresting considering the results in Section 6 documenting that the positive rela­
tionship between trade openness and the stringency of anti trust laws waned after 
the 1990s. However, Table 6 suggests that enforcement resources and activities 
remained positively correlated with exposure to trade during 1990–2010. For 
those who believe that enforcement is a better measure of stringency than law on 
the books, this may be the strongest evidence yet that increased trade openness 
is associated with countries adopting and maintaining more stringent anti trust 
regimes.
To further explore why we still find a positive correlation between trade open­
ness and anti trust enforcement for 1990–2010, we recreate our regressions for 
the two subsamples in Figure 6, that is, excluding late adopters and excluding 
early adopters. Figure 10 presents binned scatterplots using the regression speci­
fications from column 6 of Table 6 for these subsamples. The results in Figure 10 
suggest that the correlations between predicted trade shares and the measures of 
anti trust enforcement resources and activities are weakly positive. However, al­
though the coefficients of interest are consistently positive when running the full 
set of regression specifications from Table 6, they are not consistently statistically 
significant. The results are inconclusive but are noticeably different from those in 
Figure 6. Thus, taken together, the results in Section 6 suggest that late adopters 
Figure 10. Predicted trade and anti trust enforcement
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may have adopted anti trust laws that did not correspond to their trade openness, 
but the results in in this section suggest that countries with greater exposure to 
trade may be more likely to dedicate resources and pursue cases to enforce those 
laws.
8. Conclusion
We use new comparative anti trust data to test whether countries with greater 
trade openness also have more stringent anti trust regimes. When instrumenting 
for trade openness using predicted trade flows, we find a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between trade openness and countries’ anti trust laws. 
Our results are largely consistent when using alternative methods for measur­
ing anti trust stringency and trade and when introducing additional data sets that 
more comprehensively measure countries’ anti trust regimes.
We leave several important questions for future research. First, our results do 
not settle the theoretical debate over whether countries that exhibit trade open­
ness benefit from having more stringent anti trust regimes. High levels of trade 
openness and strict anti trust regimes may complement each other and create 
more competitive markets, but stringent anti trust regimes may be redundant 
once a country is exposed to trade. Future research should test the effect of the re­
lationship between trade openness and anti trust stringency on market outcomes.
Second, our results do not explore why countries with greater trade openness 
are likely to have also adopted more stringent anti trust regimes. Countries may be 
pursuing the strategies together to promote more competitive markets. However, 
with increasing trade liberalization, domestic firms may urge the government to 
employ anti trust policy in ways that allow them to obtain protection from for­
eign rivals (Guzman 1998; Baumol and Ordover 1985). For instance, Dixit (1984) 
notes that trade liberalization is commonly thought to invite domestic mergers 
and limit foreign entry in an effort to help domestic industry withstand compe­
tition. Similarly, Bond (2013) argues that large economies that can affect world 
prices may use trade and anti trust policies strategically to manipulate the terms 
of trade in their favor.
In addition to these theoretical arguments, there are a few empirical studies 
that suggest that countries may use anti trust policies to protect domestic firms 
from foreign competition. For instance, Shughart, Silverman, and Tollison (1995) 
study US anti trust enforcement budgets prior to 1981 and find a positive correla­
tion between the level of imports and anti trust enforcement budgets for the De­
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, which they interpret as 
evidence of anti trust regulations being leveraged to counter foreign competition. 
In addition, Özden (2005–6) examines 209 mergers in the EU from 1995 to 1999 
involving at least one US firm and finds that more extensive review of a merger is 
likely if the target is European or if all US firms in the industry have high market 
share. This, Özden argues, signifies a political and economic tendency to protect 
European firms. Finally, Cremieux and Snyder (2016) study cartel enforcement 
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by the EU and the United States and find that the United States levies signifi­
cantly higher fines on foreign firms than domestic firms.
However, others question any systematic use of anti trust law for protection­
ist purposes, noting that anti trust regulation is a blunt instrument to manipulate 
trade flows (Bradford 2007). For instance, Bradford, Jackson, and Zytnick (2018), 
a study on EU merger control in 1990–2014, contradicts the finding of Özden 
(2005–6). Using data covering over 5,000 mergers, Bradford, Jackson, and Zyt­
nick (2018) find no evidence that the European Commission intervenes more fre­
quently or more extensively in mergers involving foreign acquirers. Thus, the de­
bate over whether the surge in anti trust regimes in the presence of open trade is a 
sign of countries’ steadfast commitment to market competition or, alternatively, 
economic protectionism moving from traditional trade instruments to anti trust 
instruments remains unresolved.
These results provide new evidence about the relationship between interna­
tional trade and anti trust policy. Yet research on the relationship between trade 
and anti trust law should not end here. We hope that our project will spark new 
empirical investigations about whether protectionism can migrate from trade 
policy to anti trust policy as a result of trade opening and about how these two pol­
icy tools can best be used to promote competitive markets and economic growth.
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